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INTRODUCTION
Defendants/Appellees Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless ("Law
Firm"), Clark Waddoups ("Waddoups"), Jonathan O. Hafen ("Hafen") and Justin
P. Matkin ("Matkin"), collectively "defendants", in the Brief of Appellees ("Def.
Br."), appear to attempt to sidestep the simple question on which certiorari was
authorized, namely: "Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district
court's dismissal of the Petitioners' complaint." Order granting certiorari, dated
November 23, 2010.
The question on which certiorari was granted is resolved by applying a
single standard, the standard of Rule 12(b)(6), to a single document, the First
Amended Complaint ("FAC"). See Opening Brief of Appellants ("PI. Br."), at 2-3
(Statement of The Issues Presented on Appeal). That statement is unchallenged
by defendants.
Nevertheless, defendants do not address that issue and that standard,
instead passing it like ships in the night. Starting with the "Statement of Issues
and Standards of Review" section ("DB Issues"), the Def. Br. tries to reshape the
issue on which certiorari was granted and the applicable standard. In the DB
Issues, defendants argue: 'To protect the trade secrets, lomed retained the
Parr firm to file a complaint and obtain discovery orders authorizing the seizure of
Mr. Yanaki's computer files for in-camera review. [Emphasis added]" The FAC
subject to the certiorari issue never, however, pleads in any way that any trade
secrets actually existed or that any action was to protect trade secrets. Instead,
1

the FAC pleads: "[Defendants' client] desired to misuse a legal process to cause
an illegal raid on the Home as a form of message to its employees that they
would be better off signing new agreements than leaving and risking their own
homes being raided[ ]" and "Defendants agreed to help their client... [by]
ostensibly protecting trade secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation,
rather than what they were really doing, namely, seeking to have the Police
conduct an illegal raid." FAC fflj 8-9, R.131. The distortion in defendants'
argument might be attributed to simple error, except that such misstatements of
both fact and law permeate the Def. Br. to such an extent that one might
conclude they are deliberate.
The Def. Br. repeatedly refers to the original, superseded complaint.1 Such
references improperly suggest to this Court that the matters discussed are from
the FAC or that ruminations about changes between the superseded complaint,
and the operative FAC are pertinent to the applicable standard, when they are
not. Defendants further divert attention from the FAC by including, in their

1

"Once a party has amended a pleading, the amended pleading
supercedes the original pleading, and the original pleading performs no function
in the case." Campbell v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397, H 17, 38 P.3d 984, 990 (citing
6 Federal Practice & Procedure, Wright, Miller & Kane § 1476 (1990)).
Defendants seek to beg question from changes between the original complaint
and the FAC, matters wholly inapposite to the issue or the standard of review:
"Missing from the amended complaint are allegations of fraud in obtaining the
discovery orders. (Compare R. 11-32, with 129-38.) Plaintiffs have never
explained how the nature of events concerning the discovery orders changed
once plaintiffs settled their claims against lomed more than three years after the
discovery orders were issued." Def. Br., at 7.
2

"Statement of Facts," a multitude of "facts" that nowhere appear in the FAC. For
example, defendants characterize the "discovery order" in the "lomed lawsuit"
with no citation to the FAC and then selectively excerpt quotes from an
attachment not to the FAC but rather their clients own complaint attached as an
exhibit to the superseded complaint. Def. Br. at 11-12. Defendants neatly omit
that Matkin and co-conspirators "illegally entered the Home without lawful
authority, justification or consent, then illegally searched it and illegally
seized property belonging to Moss, Yanaki and third parties; all the while,
Kopp and the defendants knew that the legal process obtained could not be used
lawfully to threaten to kick in the door to the Home, threaten to 'detain' anyone
who interfered with such illegal act, search the Home or seize property therein."
FAC H 30, R. 136.
The selective omission of material allegations pertinent to the certiorari
issue and standard of review is, like the use of materials outside the FAC,
pervasive in the Def. Br. Unfortunately, page limits prevent a full exposition of the
breadth and nature of these and other traits of the Def. Br. that attempt to lead
the reader away from the central issue presented on certiorari and the standard
of review for that issue. Likewise, the overabundance of case law cited in the
Def. Br. prevents a full exposition of the unrelatedness of each case through
extensive analysis. However, the categories of the propositions for which those
cases are offered can and is, below, distinguished from the actual issue
presented on certiorari and the actual, applicable legal principles.
3

A note of caution must therefore accompany the reading of and weight
assigned to the "facts" and legal authorities found in the Def. Br. The only
material facts under the standard of review for this Court are the facts set forth in
the operative FAC and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.
The only material issue is whether the Court of Appeals' affirmance of dismissal
of the FAC, on a pleadings motion, was proper.
ARGUMENT
I.

REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THERE IS "STATE ACTION" MOSS AND YANAKI
HAVE A PROTECTED RIGHT OF PRIVACY; ABSENT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT,
THEIR HOME COULD NOT BE INVADED WITHOUT GIVING RISE TO TORT
LIABILITY.

It seems like an obvious proposition that if someone threatens to kick in the
door of another's home and threatens to "detain" the homeowner while an
unauthorized search of the home is committed, that the occupant of the home
has suffered multiple injuries for which the common law provides remedies.
There has been extreme emotional distress inflicted by the unlawful entry into
and search of the home by strangers- a clearly extreme and outrageous act.
There has been an invasion of the homeowners' privacy. There has been a
trespass onto the homeowners' real property. There has been a trespass on and
conversion of the chattels which belong to the homeowner. And if the invader or
invaders had entered into an agreement with others who were not present but
who facilitated the invasion the co-conspirators would share equal culpability and
liability. There could be no question that a burglar could, in addition to criminal
4

liability, be sued civilly by the homeowner for the commission of such torts.
But defendants here, one of whom actually directly committed the acts
described above and all of whom conspired with others to cause the illegal
invasion, claim that a complaint, the FAC, that pleads such conduct, does not
state any claim for relief against them.
Why? Well, they say, they obtained an ex parte order from a judge, in a
lawsuit against one of the homeowners, absent at the time of the illegal search
and seizure, and who had left their clients' employment some four months earlier.
They assert that by waiving that order in front of the homeowner and having an
armed, uniformed police officer doing the waiving and threatening to kick in the
door, the common law does not apply to them- even though it would apply to
anyone else. Now consider the true requisite to avoid liability under the common
law for a search and seizure conducted within a person's home. The consent of
the homeowner is one way to avoid liability. That did not occur here. The other
way is to be a peace officer, either armed with a valid search warrant or with well
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, none of which existed here.
The defendants borrow from the decision in the action brought by Moss
and Yanaki against defendants in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
They say that the federal court found no "state action" and so the state court
should likewise find no "state action." But whether "state action" existed to
support a section 1983 claim does not affect the existence of common law

5

remedies for violations of fundamental rights.2

defendants cite Torres v. First State Bank, 588 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir.
1978), to support their argument that "[a] private actor does not act under state
law 'where the only infirmities are the excess of the court orders itself, subject to
immediate modification by a court having jurisdiction over the parties, and subject
to the normal process of appeal.'" Brief at 30 (quoting Torres at 1326-27). In
Torres, the court recognized the holding of Judge Murrah in Bottone v. Lindsley,
170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert, denied, 336 U.S. 944, 69 S. Ct. 810, 93 L.Ed.
1101 (1949), where he concluded:
It is conceivable that persons, either individually or acting in concert
might so use the state judicial process as to deprive a person of
his property without due process of law, or of equal protection of
the laws, yet we are certain that to make out a cause of action under
the Civil Rights Statutes, the state court proceedings must have
been a complete nullity, with a purpose to deprive a person of
his property without due process of law. To hold otherwise would
open the door wide to every aggrieved litigant in a state court
proceedings, and set the federal courts up as an arbiter of the
correctness of every state decision.
Torres at 1326 (emphasis added). The purpose for the warrantless search
was to instill fear in the other lomed employees. Due process was ignored,
factual support overlooked, and constitutional rights trampled by the
warrantless search by the defendants' threat of force. Judge Murah
describes the behavior by the defendants perfectly, as the illegal warrant
and warrantless search were a complete nullity with a purpose to deprive
Yanaki and Moss of not only their property, but of their constitutional right
to privacy, without due process of law. Defendants cite State v. Watts, 750
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988), as support for their argument that the Utah
Constitution applies exclusively to state actors and include the following
quote: "[Unreasonable private searches are not subject to the protection of
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Def. Br. at 30-31. Defendants
go on to say that all of the cases cited in the Opening Brief are not
applicable and are beside the point. Def. Br. at 31. However, the court in
Watts recognized that "[a] search conducted by a private person acting as
the agent of a governmental authority is not a private search. In such an
instance, the protections of the fourth amendment do have application, as
do the protections of Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Watts at
1221. In Watts, an informant met a police officer in front of the defendant's
house and notified him that the defendant was growing marijuana in a
greenhouse in his backyard. Id at 1220. Later that day, police returned with
a warrant to search the shed. Id. Prior to the search, the police had told the
informant that if he provided information against the defendant, charges
(continued...)
fi

They continue by arguing that with no "state action" the privacy protections of the
United States and Utah Constitutions are inapposite to this case: "The legal
assumption is incorrect because the Parr firm, as affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, is
not a state actor, and, as a result, constitutional search and seizure provisions
are not a limit on its conduct." Def. Br. 19.
But if there was no state action at all (as opposed to "state action" for
purposes of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the context before the
federal district court), then there was no valid search warrant. Without a valid
search warrant, defendants could lawfully obtain entrance to Moss and Yanaki's
home and remove Yanaki and Moss' property therefrom by the consent of Moss
and Yanaki. And since no consent was given, defendants have no defense
available to them. Defendants also ignore the fact that they hired, and paid, an
armed, uniformed, deputy sheriff, Heinz Kopp ("Kopp"), who threatened to kick in
Moss and Yanaki's door and who gained entry and conducted, along with Matkin
and other co-conspirators, the search and seizure.3

2

(...continued)
against him might be dismissed. Id. The district court denied the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the search
because the motion lacked sufficient evidence that the informant was
operating under an agency relationship with the police department. Id. The
facts of Watts are clearly distinguishable and void any application to the
case before this Court.
3

The United States and Utah Constitutions certainly applied to Kopp. He
agreed to help defendants get into the home of Moss and Yanaki and take their
property. Kopp succeeded in that effort. Kopp needed a lawful search warrant.
Kopp did not seek or obtain a lawful search warrant. Absent a lawful search
warrant, Kopp, no differently than defendants, could not enter Yanaki and Moss'
(continued...)
7

So the point of this action is that no one could enter Moss and Yanaki's
home and take their property without their consent without being subject to
liability for the common law torts they committed. Defendants cannot rely on
Kopp to avoid liability because he needs either consent or a valid search warrant.
Kopp had none of the above and so defendants cannot rely on some claim that
Kopp could enter the home and therefore they could rely on Kopp's right to do so.
At the end of the day, it does not matter whther there was state action.
Nobody, not Kopp and not the defendants, could pass the threhhold of Moss and
Yanaki's home without a valid search warrant.
II.

UTAH LAW BARS PRIVATE SEARCH WARRANTS.

Call it whatever defendants wish to call it, when they obtained a civil order
to enter a home and seize property in that home, they obtained a private search
warrant. Under the United States and Utah Constitutions, only a valid search
warrant authorizes entry into a home without consent or a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement.
Defendants argue long and hard that the Lanham Act allows warrantless
seizures of knockoff goods and indeed that Act does contain such a provision.4

3

(...continued)
home without consent. Kopp, like defendants, did not obtain or have such
consent.
4

None of the Lanham Act cases cited by defendants involved the invasion
of a home, rather than a business. Privacy expectations are plainly much greater
in a home than in a business and it might be argued under the Lanham Act that
the Act was never intended to allow homes to be invaded and searched even if
knock-off goods might be seized without a warrant. The one case cited in one
(continued...)
a

There are well-defined procedures pursuant to rules written by the United States
Supreme Court long ago that must be scrupulously followed before such an entry
may occur. Even then, although the United States Supreme Court wrote those
rules, it has never been presented with or decided a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Lanham Act's warrantless seizure provision and it is
4

(...continued)
article about the Lanham Act cited in the Def. Br. that did involve a home did not
involve any constitutional challenge to the seizure. Defendants use AT&T
Broadband v. Tech Communs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2004), as an
example of federal court approval of ex parte discovery orders "in other
circumstances." Def. Br. at 39. In general terms, defendants attempt to apply that
case as support for their argument that, although the Trade Secrets Act does not
explicitly authorize the district court to issue an ex parte seizure order, the
authority is inherently within the jurisdiction of the court under UTAH CODE ANN. §
13-24-3(3).
In AT&T Broadband, AT&T obtained an ex-parte order to enter a home
and seize business records evidencing the /7/ega/ sale of cable descrambling
devices under the Cable Communications Policy Act ("CCPA"). AT&T Broadband,
381 F.3d at 1311-13. The defendant argued that because the CCPA did not
provide explicit authorization to district courts to grant an ex parte search warrant
like the Lanham Act, Congress did not intend to provide district courts with the
authority to grant such orders. Id at 1319. The court of appeals determined that
the district court had inherent equitable authority to issue a search warrant. Id.
The AT&T Broadband court further discussed Lanham Act cases which
required that ex parte seizures were proper "only if providing notice to the
defendant would 'render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.'" Id.
(quoting In re Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1979)(pe/-ci/r/am)).The
court further explained that, "[t]o support an ex parte seizure motion, the plaintiff
may not rely on bare assertions that the defendant, if given notice, would destroy
relevant evidence," but, "[r]ather, the Plaintiff must 'show that [the] defendantf], or
persons involved in similar activities, had ... concealed evidence or disregarded
court orders in the past'" Id. (quoting First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11
F.3d 641, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Defendants made no showing that providing notice to Yanaki would have
"rendered fruitless the further prosecution of the action," and in fact they had
available to them Yanaki's co-defendants who were alleged to have received the
trade secrets they alleged Yanaki stole from which they could have obtained any
evidence of stolen trade secrets. But regardless of AT&T Broadband, Allen v.
Trueman prohibits such private search warrants in Utah.
9

recognized that the constitutionality under the United States Constitution is an
open question.
This Court's decision in Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355,
361 (1941), put to rest any argument that such private search warrants may be
used for any purpose in Utah. Allen was discussed extensively in the PI. Br., at
20-23, so that discussion will not be repeated here. However, two reply points
are worth covering. First, Allen dealt with a seizure of knockoff goods just as the
Lnham Act would allow. So Lanham Act cases provide no guidance under Utah
law. Second, the action in Allen, where this Court found constitutional violations
under both the United States and Utah Constitutions in the use of private search
warrants including, inter alia, Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.
III.

THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PROTECT AGAINST
COMMON LAW TORT LIABILITY FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF HOMES AND
SEIZURES.

Moss and Yanaki's arguments concerning the judicial proceedings
privilege, addressing the applicable Utah law, have already been thoroughly
presented in PI. Br., at 37-46 and will not be repeated here. Defendants'
argument that the privilege precludes common law remedies for their nonconsensual, warrantless search and seizure is grounded largely in citations to
numerous non-Utah cases that do not involve non-consensual, warrantless
searches and seizures.
Defendants assert that Durgin v. Cohen, 209 N.W. 532 (Minn. 1926) holds
that the law does not forbid entry into a dwelling to execute a writ of replevin.

10

Def. Br. at 17, n.12. What defendants omit is that the plaintiff consented to allow
officers into her home and no force or threats were used against the plaintiff. See
id. at 532-33.5
Defendants' examination of Utah law is equally flawed. They argue that
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366 requires ambiguity as to whether the
privilege should be applied to attorney conduct to be resolved in favor of applying
the privilege. Def. Br. at 21. Pratt involved a 16-year-old girl whose father
allegedly forced her to marry her uncle. Id. at ]f 4, 370. The girl filed a complaint
against her father and over 240 other individuals alleging polygamous
connections and intentional and negligent conduct in failing to prevent her alleged
abuse. Id. After she filed the complaint, the girl and her attorney held a press
conference and distributed copies of the complaint to national news sources. Id at
Id. at H 4, 371. The individuals named in the complaint filed a lawsuit for
defamation against the girl and her attorney. Id. at H 6. The girl's attorney claimed
the defamation action based on the complaint was not actionable as protected by
the judicial proceedings privilege. Id. at U 9, 372.
This Court, discussed the three requirements of the privilege, the second of

5

Defendants argue that Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864 (W.Va. 2005)
holds that there is no difference between communications or conduct occurring
during litigation. Def. Br. at 18. The court in Clark was careful to apply the
litigation privilege narrowly in limited circumstances. Clark, 624 S.E.2d at 870.
Defendants omit to point out that the court excluded from the protection
"intentional conduct which is unrelated to legitimate litigation tactics and which
harms an opposing party." Id. at 870. Even if Clark extended the privilege to
some conduct, then, it did not extend it to non-consensual, warrantless searches
and seizures.
11

which being whether the statement has "some relationship to the cause or subject
matter involved" in the litigation "although it 'need not be relevant or pertinent to
the judicial proceeding from an evidentiary point of view for the privilege to apply."
Id. at fl 30, 376 (quoting Debry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, fl 16, 992 P.2d 979). This
court proclaimed "[t]hus, if doubt as to relevancy exists, it should be resolved in
favor of the statement having reference to the subject matter of the proceeding."
Id. (emphasis added). This Court did not speak to ambiguity about whether the
privilege applied to conduct. Indeed, defamatory statements, not conduct, were
involved in the case. The question was whether the girl's complaint was relevant
to the subject matter of the litigation so as to allow the privilege to apply.6
Defendants assert that Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642, 657
(Idaho 2010) makes clear there is no difference between a litigation privilege and
the judicial proceedings privilege. Def. Br. at 22 n.13, 25. 7 They also cite Taylor

defendants quote the following from Douglas R. Richmond, THE LAWYER'S
31 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 281, 316 (Fall 2007): "[ajbsent
malicious prosecution or similar allegations, a lawyer's bad faith litigation conduct
is remedied by way of sanctions or professional discipline, not the loss of the
litigation privilege with respect to a letter clearly within its scope." However, the
cases discussed in the quoted article discuss the filing of paperwork or
statements made during litigation. The article does not purport to address
anything like a non-consensual warrantless search of a home and seizure of
property, let alone one conducted through threats of violence.
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE,

defendants cite Alpert v. Cram, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398
(Tex. Ct. App. 2005), for the contention that tort liability for attorney's statements
or actions in the course of representing clients are so clearly barred by existing
law that sanctions should be awarded. Def. Br. at 23. In Alpert, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant firm concealed their client's malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, filed frivolous lawsuits against the plaintiff, and
disparaged plaintiffs reputation in the business community. Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at
(continued...)
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for the proposition that only where attorneys act separately from advancing his
client's interests, the privilege does not apply. Def. Br. at 25. Defendants again
omit the salient qualifier- for application of the litigation privilege an attorney must
be "acting within the law, in a legitimate effort to zealously advance the interests
of his client." Taylor at 656.8 Since defendants and their co-conspirators were not
7

(.. .continued)
402. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiff failed to set forth
a claim or plead a cause of action under Texas law. Id. at 403. At that time, the
trial court granted a motion for sanctions against plaintiff for attorney fees and
expenses. Id. The court determined that "the trial court reasonably could have
concluded from these facts that this lawsuit was filed on the 'eve of trial' for an
improper purpose "including harassment, delay, needless cost and expense, and
potential for lessening [defendant law firm's] zealous representation'" of its client,
and upheld the trial court's award of sanctions against the plaintiff. Id. at 412. The
facts in Alpert are thus clearly distinguishable from this case. Defendants also
argue Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062 (Ore. 2006), as holding that the
litigation privilege extends to attorney conduct unless the conduct was outside the
scope of the lawyer-client relationship. Def. Br. at 24. In Reynolds, plaintiff sued
the defendant's client for breach of fiduciary duty, and sued the defendant
attorney for his role in that alleged breach. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1063. This
claim alone separates Reynolds as a claim for secondary liability since no lawyer
conducted a warrantless search and seizure with the police. Defendants also cite
Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), which is also a secondary
liability case. Def. Br. at 25. Secondary liability understandably requires an
element of malice to imply wrongdoing sufficient to deny immunity via the
litigation privilege, since the direct act is alleged against the attorney's client.
Defendants also cite Unarco Material Handling, Inc. v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). Def. Br. at 25. The court in Unarco similarly decided
whether a corporation's attorney induced its former president to breach the
confidentiality provisions of a retirement agreement, a secondary liability claim. Id
at 228. Durham and Unarco are not applicable to this case because, here, Moss
and Yanaki directly seek damages from the defendants for their participation in
the warrantless search and seizure itself, which is not protected by the litigation
privilege. As previously discussed, the litigation privilege is only available to
parties who are acting in accordance with the law. See Taylor, 243 P.3d at 65657.
defendants argue that, as agents for lomed, Millennium Equity Holdings,
(continued...)
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invited into Moss and Yanaki's home but instead made a non-consensual
warrantless entry, they were not acting within the law. So even if Utah ever
adopted some litigation privilege as to conduct, this case would not fall within
such a privilege.
IV.

Moss AND YANAKI DID NOT WAIVE "DEFECTS" IN THE PRIOR LITIGATION
BECAUSE NO FINAL ORDER WAS ENTERED.

Any argument of waiver of a defect in the ex parte seizure order is
misplaced, since the former litigation was resolved through settlement.
Defendants cite Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Utah 1978), to
support their argument that Yanaki and Moss could have moved to quash the
discovery orders because the affidavits did not describe property value, but that
because they did not, they waived any defect. Def. Br. at 41. 9 The ex parte

(...continued)
LLC v. Mahlowitz, 925 N.E.2d 513 (Mass. 2010), shields them from lomed's
motive for their direction of their conduct of the litigation. Brief at 37. They quote
the following from Millenium: "unless there is evidence to the contrary, a client's
improper motivation should not be imputed to his attorney." Def. Br. at 37 (quoting
Millennium, 925 N.E.2d at 532). Defendants argue that the complaint does not
allege that defendants acted in bad faith other than conducting an unlawful
search, since lomed's motives cannot be imputed to them.
Millennium is a case involving a request for sanctions against the plaintiff's
wife's attorneys in a divorce action for obtaining an attachment on property that
plaintiff secretly planned to sell, in the form of malicious prosecution and abuse of
process claims. Millennium, 925 N.E.2d at 516. Factually, this case is clearly
distinguishable in that it is not for sanctions like in Millennium. Defendants did not
seek a writ of attachment. They committed a non-consensual, warrantless
search and seizure by threat of force.
9

Bank of Ephraim was a case involving a writ of attachment for defendant's
personalty issued prior to the foreclosure sale of realty owned by defendant. Bank
of Ephraim, 581 P.2d at 1002. Initially in that case, this Court recognized that the
bank could not attempt to collect on the defendant's debt through the writ of
(continued...)
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private search warrant, procedurally defective or not, is not the valid search
warrant that is required to conduct a non-consensual search and seizure.
Defendants contend that because Yanaki did not move to quash the private
search warrant because the affidavits were defective, Yanaki waived his right to
contest any defect in the seizure order. Def. Br. at 41. Defendants argue that
Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Johnson, 552 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1976), supports
that contention because this Court determined that errors in an affidavit to secure
the writ of attachment were harmless after the property had already been sold.
Def. Br. at 41. What this Court actually determined was that the error in the
attachment based upon a security interest was harmless because the property
would ultimately still have been sold or repossessed by the party who obtained
the order. Bank of Pleasant Grove, 552 P.2d at 1277.10
Defendants cite Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist, 2008 UT 70, to support the
argument that the issues in this case are the same as those in the case before

9

(.. .continued)

attachment on the personal property until the security on the real property had
been exhausted. Id. at 1003. Although the writ was lacking under Rule 64C(h),
this failure was ultimately only a factor in determining that the writ was not valid.
Id. at 1006.
10

Ban/c of Pleasant Grove blossomed from an effort to recover on a
delinquent promissory note. Id. "The property was attached before judgment and
was sold at a foreclosure sale after judgment was obtained." Id. Following the
deficiency judgment, the defendants appealed and claimed that the technical
defects in the affidavit on which the writ of attachment was obtained. Id. The court
determined that there was no harm to defendants from the error, since the bank
had a security interest in the property and could have repossessed it without a
breach of the peace, and because the property would have been sold pursuant to
court order. Id. Bank of Pleasant Grove thus is inapposite.
15

Judge Benson and should be prevented as a matter of issue preclusion. Def. Br.
at 32. The initial cite to Oman outlines the elements of issue preclusion, in
addition to the statement that "[W]here two causes of action embody the same
dispositive issue, a prior determination of that issue in the context of one cause of
action can have a preclusive effect in later litigation regarding the other cause of
action." Id. quoting Oman, 2008 UT 70 a t f l 13. When Judge Benson dismissed
Moss and Yanaki's section 1983 claims, he declined to exercise any
jurisdiction over Moss and Yanaki's state court claims: "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3) the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims." Yanaki v. lomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d
1261, 1266 (D. Utah 2004). Since Judge Benson expressly declined to exercise
any jurisdiction over Moss and Yanaki's state law claims, no preclusive effect
exists as to those claims.11
Defendants cite Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 2005 UT App
11

Judge Benson did, however, note the possible viability of such state law
claims especially in light of the unreasonableness of the search and seizure. Id.
at 1264-65 nn.7 & 8 ("Nonetheless, it appears clear that the conduct complained
of in this case would be in violation of the Fourth Amendment if state action were
involved. The invasion of Plaintiffs home, supported only by an ex parte
submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit, appears to be precisely the
type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling that the Fourth Amendment
is designed to prevent. Defendants' protestations to the contrary, an ex parte
motion presented to a judge in the course of civil litigation is not the equivalent of
a probable cause search warrant affidavit submitted by an independent law
enforcement officer. If there was a sufficient basis for finding that Defendants'
actions in this case were committed under color of state law, this Court would find
that Plaintiffs were deprived of a right secured by the "Constitution and Laws" of
the United States." and "[a]s noted in footnote seven, above, the behavior of the
Defendants may have been inadvisable and abusive of Plaintiffs' rights, and may or may
not give rise to other legal causes of action, such as perhaps abuse of process . . ..")
16

279, U 4, 119 P.3d 302, to combat the argument that they are estopped from
arguing the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Judge
Benson, in a footnote, stated that, had there been state action, the seizure would
have violated the Fourth Amendment. Brief at 35 n.19. They claim that the
Dunlap case absolves them from needing to appeal a favorable ruling. Id.
However, the court in Dunlap cites Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987), stated that "'[c]ross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a party
has with the judgment as it was entered-not grievances it might acquire
depending on the outcome of the appeal.' Thus, a 'cross-appeal would not have
been appropriate' since there was 'no dissatisfaction with the judgment which [the
Dunlaps] simply wanted to have affirmed.' As a result, 'the absence of the crossappeal did not, of itself, foreclose the trial court from reassessing' the issue of
adverse possession..'" Dunlap at P4 (internal citations omitted).
Defendants present Buzzanco v. Lord Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 376 (W.D.
Pa. 2001) as evidence that courts have held that claims on discovery orders were
estopped if the orders were never challenged or found to be lawful in the lawsuit
in which they were issued. Def. Br. at 45. Buzzanco simply does not recognize
what Utah law does, namely, that a upon a settlement, any possible appeal is
mooted. Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Smith, 2002 UT 49, If 3, 48 P.3d
976, 977 ("Moreover, 'where the actions of the parties themselves cause a
settling of their differences, the case becomes moot,' and 'an appeal will be
dismissed as moot where the matter raised was settled by agreement, such as by
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. .. voluntary dismissal of a claim.' [citing 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 654
(1995)]").
V.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT AGAINST COMMON LAW TORT
LIABILITY FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF HOMES AND SEIZURES.

Moss and Yanaki's discussion of the First Amendment and its lack of
applicability to the matter before this Court has already been thoroughly and
sufficiently addressed in PI. Br. at 46-49 and will not be repeated. But defendants
cite to numerous cases which are wholly inapplicable to the matter before this
Court. Defendants contend that the First Amendment right to petition government
protects them from common law liability for their warrantless search and seizure
because of the holding in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972). Def. Br. at 26-27. Their reading is incorrect. California Motor
Transport is an antitrust case under the Clayton Act. It does not involve a nonconsensual and warrantless search and seizure.
Defendants cite McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985), to support
their application of California Motor Transport by quoting the following: "filing a
complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity." Def. Br. at 27. McDonald
actually undermines defendants' application of California Motor Transport by
pointing out that the First Amendment Petition Clause does not provide absolute
immunity. See McDonald, All U.S. at 485 ("Nor do the Court's decisions
interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts other than defamation indicate the
right to petition is absolute"). Further, the Court stated that "[t]he right to petition is
guaranteed; the right to commit libel with impunity is not," demonstrating that the
18

Petition Clause does not protect against all tort liability, /of.12 Defendants contend
that Cove Rd. Dev. v. Western Cranston Indus. ParkAssocs., 674 A.2d 1234,
1237 (R.I. 1996), opens the right to petition beyond antitrust cases to include
common-law tort claims, stating that the doctrine can bar claims for abuse of
process. Def. Br. at 27. The plaintiff in Cove Rd. raised claims against defendants
for malicious prosecution and abuse of process for instituting and pursuing an
appeal of zoning amendments that were requested by the plaintiff and were
granted by the municipality. Cove Rd., 674 A.2d at 1235. Once again, the claim in

12

Defendants quote Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948,
956 (S.D. Cal. 1996), for the contention that "[t]he right to petition 'bars any claim,
federal or state, common law or statutory, that has as its gravamen
constitutionally-protected petitioning activity.'" Def. Br. at 27 (quoting Gen-Probe
at 956). Defendants apply Gen-Probe to distinguish Bennett v. Jones Waldo
Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, 70 P.3d 17, arguing that the "sham"
exception does not apply unless the objective and subjective tests applied in
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508
U.S. 49 (1993), are satisfied, and claiming that the allegations against the
defendants cannot succeed because "a finding that the lawsuit is not objectively
baseless precludes liability regardless of improper motive." Def. Br. at 28 (quoting
Gen-Probe at 957).
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1993), the
Court set forth the two-pronged objective-subjective test to determine whether the
challenged litigation was "outcome-driven and thus protected as an exercise of
constitutional rights or whether the lawsuits are process-driven sham activities."
The Court determined whether the suit was "objectively baseless in the sense
that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits." PRE
at 61-62. The Court explained that: "Only if the challenged litigation is objectively
meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation. Under this
second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the
baseless lawsuit conceals 'an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor', through the use [of] the governmental process - as
opposed to the outcome of that process - as an anti-competitive weapon." PRE
at 60-61. The Court further stated that "[tjhis two-tiered process requires the
plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuit's legal viability before the court will
entertain evidence of the suit's economic viability." Id at 61 (emphasis in original).
19

that case is based on filing paperwork with the court, which is substantially
different from committing a non-consensual warrantless seqarch and seizure of a
home.13
Defendants quote Anderson Dev. Co. v Tobias, 2005 UT 36, P26, 116 P.3d
323, as a "see also," and include the following text: "[U]nder the sham exception,
an individual will be liable if he uses the governmental process - as opposed to
the outcome of that process - as a weapon." Brief at 27 (quoting Anderson Dev.
Co., 2005 UT 36 at P27). In Anderson, the matter at issue to which the sham
exception is applied involved a petition to the city council to "derail" a zoning
change application. Anderson Dev Co., 2005 UT 36 at P25. The court in
Anderson quoted City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
380 (1991): "A 'sham' situation involves a defendant whose activities are not
genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action at all, not one who
genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental result, but does so through
improper means."(internal quotations and citations omitted).
There were no facts alleged in the Anderson case that brought the matter
in issue within the sham exception. Id at P28. Clearly, Anderson is

13

ln addition, the court discussed its decision in Pound Hill Corp., Inc., v.
Perl, 668 A.2d 1260 (R.I. 1996). In Pound Hill, the court determined that summary
judgment was proper because a trier of fact could determine that the defendants'
activities were objectively baseless. Id at 1264. The court determined, inter alia,
that the defendants pursued an appeal presenting "no substantive ground for
such an appeal." Id. Like in Pound Hill, defendants had no substantive ground for
their effort to obtain the search warrant, since they, as civil lawyers, cannot legally
obtain a search warrant. Also, they had no substantive ground to enforce the
search warrant, especially not by threat of force.
20

distinguishable in that defendants sought to obtain an illegal search warrant and
executed an illegal, warrantless search for the illegitimate purpose of scaring
lomed employees. Defendants' goal was intimidation through the illegal search
rather than to obtain or protect any evidence as they claim.
VI.

QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND IN ANY EVENT IF IT
COULD APPLY AT A L L IT WOULD RAISE A FACT QUESTION NOT RESOLVABLE
ON A PLEADINGS MOTION.

Defendants argue for the first time that they are immune under the doctrine
of quasi-judicial immunity, the same immunity granted in the section 1983 action
to the sheriff's deputies by the federal court. Def. Br. at 35-36.14 In Parker, two
plaintiffs filed a suit against a psychologist who was a court-appointed evaluator
in the underlying custody battle. Parker, 971 P.2d at 496. This Court upheld the
application of quasi-judicial immunity to the psychologist, /of.15 This Court
continued:
"Thus, 'immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and
serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.'" Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 227 (1998); see also Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d 1332, 1334-35
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993). Furthermore, "because absolute immunity derives,
14

Defendants cite Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998), to
suggest that this Court has drawn upon federal law when defining Utah's doctrine
of quasi-judicial immunity. Def. Br. at 36.
15

This Court cited its decision in Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278,
1280 (Utah 1993), where it had held that the Utah State Bar was entitled to
immunity when acting within the scope of its delegated judicial functions. See
Parker, 971 P.2d at 498. This Court had reasoned in Bailey that "Whether a
person or entity should be afforded judicial immunity depends upon the specific
work or function performed. If the acts were committed 'in the performance of an
integral part of the judicial process,' the policies underlying judicial immunity apply
and immunity should be granted." Bailey, 846 P.2d at 1280 (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965)).
21

not from formal association with the judicial process, but from the need to
protect functions intimately related and essential to the judicial decisionmaking process, its protections may extend to some but not all acts
performed by those associated with the judicial process.' Awai, 872 P.2d at
1334. For example, 'immunity is not established merely because a court
appointee performed acts within the scope of [a] court's order. While
performing acts within the scope of [a] court's order may in some
circumstances be necessary to establish immunity, it is not sufficient...It is
still necessary to establish that the acts performed were intimately related
and essential to the judicial decision-making process.' Awai, 872 P.2d at

1335, 36."
Parker, 971 P.2d at 498 (emphasis in original).16
The facts of this case are remarkably distinguishable. Defendants were not
appointed by the court to execute a valid search warrant. Rather, they conspired
to commit a non-consensual and warrantless search and seizure. They
additionally had no discretionary judgment, comparable to that of a judge. All of
those issues raisee fact questions not resolvable on a pleadings motion.
VII.

THE FAC OTHERWISE STATES A CLAIM.17

Defendants cite Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988), to assert
that a right of privacy is invaded only by an "unreasonable intrusion upon the
16

This Court also reasoned that psychologists are essentially acting as a
neutral fact-finder for the court. Id. The court also followed uniformly-held
determination that court-appointed psychologists perform a function integral to
the judicial process and are therefore immune from suit. Id at 499.
17

Defendants ask the court to reject all of the Opening Briefs "legal
conclusions" about defendants' actions being constitutional violations, and cite
the following quote from Jensen: "Legal conclusions, deductions, and opinions
couched as facts are ... not presumed to be true." Def. Br. at 29 (quoting Jensen
v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (D. Utah 1999)). The court in Jensen made
this statement in the context of whether the complaint was sufficient, and, more
specifically, whether the plaintiff was entitled to offer evidence to support its
claims. Jensen, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1270. For this reason, application of Jensen is
misplaced.
22

seclusion of another." The plaintiffs in Cox sued when Senator Orrin Hatch used
their photographs in a political flier, id. at 558, and the court determined the First
Amendment barred the invasion of privacy claim and there was no claim for relief
because the facts failed to meet the requirements for a false light tort action.
Defendants omit to state that the postal workers agreed to have their
photographs taken, the invasion of privacy claim was a false light claim and that
New York Times malice was applicable. Id. at 558, 564 & n.8.
Defendants argue that court-ordered discovery is not an unreasonable
intrusion, and quote the court's decision in Big Five Cmty. Servs. v. Jack, 782
P.2d 412, 414 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989), "[w]e cannot say the copying of documents
pursuant to court-ordered discovery constitutes an unreasonable intrusion into
the seclusion of another so as to support a cause of action for invasion of
privacy." Moss and Yanaki agree that copying documents is not an unreasonable
intrusion. A warrantless search and seizure in their home is.
Defendants cite Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah
1998), as support for their assertion that "trespass is a 'wrongful entry...upon the
lands of another," and that, because the entry into Yanaki's house was
undertaken on alleged authority of a court order, the entry was not wrongful as a
matter of law. Def. Br. at 48 (quoting Walker Drug, 972 P.2d at 1243). Walker
Drug did not involve the non-consensual warrantless search and seizure involved
in this case.
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Defendants assert that the conspiracy claim fails because attorneys cannot
conspire with clients while acting as their agents, and cite to Peterson v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, P12, 42 P.3d 1253, to argue that recovery under a
civil conspiracy theory requires that conspirators must commit one or more
"unlawful, overt acts." Defendants claim that simply because the other tort claims
fail, no unlawful, overt act occurred that would support a conspiracy claim. Def.
Br. at 49. Peterson quotes from Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785,
792 (Utah Ct. App. 1987): "To assert a civil conspiracy, plaintiff must also prove
that the alleged conspirators performed one or more unlawful, overt acts. If the
object of the alleged conspiracy or the means used to attain it is lawful, even if
damage results to the plaintiff or the defendant acted with a malicious motive,
there can be no civil conspiracy." Peterson, 2002 UT App 56, U 12.18
Defendants quote the following from Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746
P.2d 785, 794 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), to support their claim that no conspiracy
existed because no unlawful act was committed: "[T]he conspiracy itself is not
what gives rise to the right to action, but the torts committed in the furtherance of
the conspiracy." Def. Br. at 49. The application of that case assumes there was

18

Peterson was based on the plaintiff's grievance against his employer for
failing to allow him to take his "final flight" as an airline pilot prior to his retirement
because of allegations of his abuse of the sick leave policy. Id. at H 5. In
Peterson, the only allegedly unlawful event referenced in the Plaintiff's complaint
was that defendant required the plaintiff to be in Los Angeles to deliver a note
from his physician certifying his illness. Id. The plaintiff later attempted to amend
his complaint to allege that the defendant unlawfully withheld his flight privileges
following the investigation based merely on malicious motive. Id. at ^f 12. Clearly,
there is no factual application of Peterson to this case.
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no tort committed, which is not accurate.
CONCLUSION
The warrant requirement of the United States and Utah Constitutions is a
protection that may not be lightly cast aside. This Court has already refused to
do so in Allen. The Court should now extend Allen and hold that common law
remedies exist for home invasions by private litigants who possess neither the
consent of the homeowners nor are accompanied by peace officers who do not
hold valis search warrants. In those circumstances, the FAC states a claim and
so the court of appeals' decision should be reversed and the case remanded.
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